pose is to cast the relationship between person and nature in terms of metaphor in order to respect the essential unity of nature and person required by a proper understanding of the natural law; to retrieve the creative and active character of moral reasoning; and to sharpen our understanding of the historicity of natural-law arguments. My analysis is divided into three sections. First, I provide an overview of theoretical treatments of metaphor from various intellectual contexts. Second, I attempt to show how the mutual accommodation of person and nature allows for the contours of a metaphorical structure of normativity to emerge. Finally, I explain how the metaphorical structure of normativity provides a new point of departure for analyzing the moral act in general and the theory of intrinsic evil in particular. STUDIES For Heidegger, the poet George caught an essential characteristic of language that had long been ignored or obscured by the positivist tendencies present in philosophers of science. The separation of the cognitive and expressive functions of language characteristic of positivism limited epistemic endeavors to the empirical sciences. Scientific language had a representative function for the positivist; scientific propositions had a direct reference to the world. The mutual correlation between sense and reference gave scientific language a univocal or literal character. Lacking any referential significance, metaphor was "a wholly noncognitive, subjective, emotive, or stylistic use of language." 3 For the positivist, the use of metaphor was equivalent to engaging in pretense, "that is, re-presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms appropriate to another." 4 For George's voyager, however, language has a far richer role. Contact with language is an experience of the world. The vision that the poet enjoys from "distant land" is brought to "the twilit norn" to be named in order for the poet "to grasp it close and strong." Upon returning from "happy sail," the poet has a prize which is "rich and frail"; but since it is a prize that the goddess cannot identify ("no like of this these depths enfold"), it vanishes from the voyager's hand, a treasure that "never graced my land." The poet learns that "where word breaks off no thing may be." 5 The poet, of course, is not describing an actual voyage but is writing figuratively or metaphorically. Aristotle, in his Poetics, holds that "metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else, the transference (epi-phora) being either from genus to species or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy." 6 Derived from the verb metapherein which means to carry something from one place to another, metaphor is the transposition or transfer of a name from one context to another. This transfer introduces an element of incongruity into language in a way that metaphor displaces the common usage of a name with a new and unfamiliar one. Like the voyager who encounters alien lands, metaphor allows the poet to move back and forth between contexts to find similarities and differences between them.
In contrast to the comparative theory of metaphor found in Aristotle is what has been labeled a semantic interaction theory of metaphor. Comparison theories of metaphor maintain that there is an equivalence between literal and metaphorical expressions; interaction theories, on the other hand, focus on the tension that a metaphor creates between a literal context and figurative expression. As Searle observes, within comparison theories, metaphors draw a "similarity between two or more objects," while for interaction theories, metaphors create a tension between "two semantic contents, that of the expression used metaphorically, and that of the surrounding literal context." 7 Proponents of the interaction theory of metaphor include philosophers of science Max Black, Thomas Kuhn, and Mary Hesse. In Black's Models and Metaphors, metaphors play a role similar to that of models in scientific inquiry. Models organize experience, exploit potential similarities within a field of discourse, and designate appropriate ways to speak and reason about the world. Similarly, Black writes that a metaphor "has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other"; the power of metaphor lies in its ability "to enable us to see a new subject matter in a new way" or "to see new connections."
6 By allowing us to approach a previously disclosed realm of experience with new purpose, metaphorical expressions reorganize and redescribe experience, which grows in complexity with each new purpose.
9 By revealing new intimations of similarity, models and metaphors are means by which reality is reinterpreted, providing new boundaries for reason and discourse. For Black and others, "both (models and metaphors) are attempts to pour new content into old bottles."
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Building on his analysis of the historical episodes that he previously labeled scientific revolutions, Kuhn holds that metaphors in science are not merely pedagogical and heuristic, but substantive and constitutive of the theories they express. Metaphors establish the necessary links between scientific language and the world. For Kuhn, however, because "those links are not given once and for all," a change in metaphor will effect the mutual accommodation between experience and language allowing scientists to reason and speak about the world anew. Without regarding all readings of nature equal as if one could ignore nature, scientists recognize that the referent to "planet" will differ before and after Copernicus; and Aristotle's definition of "motion" will make little sense in the world of 17th-century mechanics.
11 As Hesse adds, "rationality consists just in the continu- ous adaptation of our language to our continually expanding world," and metaphorical redescription is the means by which this accomplished.
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A reconciliation and development of the two theories of metaphor are found in Paul Ricoeur's The Rule of Metaphor. For Ricoeur, discussions about metaphor entail the entwinement of three themes. First, with metaphorical discourse the ordinary reference of language is suspended, eclipsed, or blurred. Second, this referential ambiguity allows for the redescription of common patterns of thinking and perceptions of reality. Third, the suspension of reference and the redescription of reality, however, involves a disclosure of something new. Metaphorical discourse means to tell us something new of reality. The metaphor, in other words, moves beyond the discovery of existing similarities to include the means of invention. Through metaphor, language not only organizes reality in a different way, but also discloses a way of being and dwelling in the world, which is brought to language thanks to semantic innovation. Ricoeur writes:
It would seem that the enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it "invents" in both senses of the word: what it creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents. ... Reality brought to language imites manifestation and creation. ... Metaphor is that strategy of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is set free.
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For Ricoeur, metaphorical tension extends beyond semantic levels to the "relational function of the copula" in a way that the metaphori- access to the world is achieved when significant features of the world are carried over, appropriated, and transformed in light of another. Both of these points from recent studies in metaphor can be illustrated by looking at the relationship between person and nature.
The relationship between person and nature is central to fundamental moral theology. In a Roman Catholic context, the relationship between person and nature has been used explicitly in fundamental and special questions of morality. The understanding of the relationship between person and nature in magisterial texts stands in the effective history of the neo-Scholastic tradition, and is marked with a strong personalist emphasis. The Catholic Church's teaching on the unity of the human being, corpore et anima unus, "does not allow for any division between freedom and nature. Indeed, these two realities are harmoniously bound together, and each is intimately linked to the other." 16 With the tradition's emphasis on the "unified totality" of the person, it is important not to identify or reduce the meaning of normative nature or the natural moral law to the laws of nature as those laws are decided by the theories and hypotheses of other sciences. There is no doubt that the empirical sciences contribute to what is meant by normative nature, as attested to by the neo-Scholastics' epistemologica! realism. Moral theology certainly runs a risk of dealing in mere abstractions and formalities if it ignores the realities of the world. The uniqueness of the natural moral law, however, is obscured when approached with the cognitive criteria of the other sciences alone. Nor is the normativity of nature in a moral sense reducible to human nature as it is given or in human nature's facticity. The natural inclinations are necessary but not sufficient criteria for the determination of normativity. The normative meaning of the natural inclinations is variant; the natural inclinations are underdetermined in a normative sense. This does not mean, however, that we can approach nature without constraint; nature is more than the raw material for normativity. To think of nature as a field of unlimited potential for human intervention would be typical of homo faber, who, as Hannah Arendt observed in her classic account of the modern condition, "thinks of the whole of nature as of an immense fabric from which we can cut out whatever we want to renew it however we like." 17 While not immediately normative, nature is a limit in the sense that freedom and rea- 16 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Veritatis splendor (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1993) para. 50. Within the neo-Scholastic tradition, the person is comprised of both intellect and will, which allows for a convergence of reason and freedom or the true and the good: "Verum et bonum se invicem includunt: nam verum est quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile... ; ita obiectum intellectus practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri" (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, q. 79, a. 11 ad 2). 17 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958) 305.
son are always in nature. Nature is an indispensable condition of freedom and reason; we cannot be freed from nature. As indispensable as nature is, however, normativity is not a property of nature. Nature is better seen as the vehicle of normativity.
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Nature is a dynamic potential that requires interpretation. Within a more critical epistemological context, then, normativity results from nature being grasped, understood, and interpreted by the ordinatio rationis.
19 Though both poles contribute to what is meant by normative nature, the rational order is the sufficient criterion of normativity. The mutually conditioning relationship between reason and nature is captured by Wilhelm Korff when he writes: "All human behavior remains universally determined by conditions which may not replace reason, since they need interpretation and to this extent do not present themselves as ethical norms, but which nevertheless eliminate arbitrariness from this behavior in all its realizations." 26 Consensus on natural-law arguments does not depend so much on nature as it is in itself, but on the community's shared expectations of freedom which sculpture, fashion, and redefine nature in a normative sense. In this way, Demmer can assert that "we watch over and protect nature when it protects us; we define its limits when it threatens us; and we nurture and improve upon it when such an in- way, but always within the boundaries established by the legitimate expectations of freedom.
Finally, reflective of the finitude of every reading, the metaphorical structure of normativity means that natura normativa shares in the effective history of freedom. The metaphorical structure of normativity reflects the mutual accommodation between freedom and nature in a way that allows for truly new meanings of normativity to arise from the dialectical structure of insight and experience. 30 As what Rorty has labelled a "final vocabulary"-"the words in which we tell ... the story of our Uves"-can be cast into doubt, forcing at least some in the language community to become philosophers to enrich the present vocabulary and to revise traditional narratives, so too, commonplace configurations of normativity can be disrupted as a prelude to a new constellation between freedom and nature. 31 As biases in the community's narrative are brought to light and reversed (similar perhaps to a shift of paradigm in the philosophy of science), new similarities between the realms of freedom and nature are recognized, or new resemblances are invented by the creative power of moral reasoning. Through the formation of a new kinship, the limits and possibilities of nature and freedom are reconfigured in such a way that new alternatives of moral action emerge.
ANALYSIS OF MORAL ACTION
Contemporary hermeneutical theory has provided a critical perspective of our historical situation where technology has eclipsed other forms of knowledge. Sharing in this hermeneutical interest allows the metaphorical structure of normativity to retrieve and enrich our understanding of practical reasoning. As a practical science, moral discourse is distinguished from both episteme and techne? 2 Practical knowledge or phronesis differs from theoretical knowledge in that theoretical knowledge is a characteristic of the vita contem- The particularity of moral reasoning allows for a more nuanced consideration of the distinction that is often made in epistemological discussions between the logic of genesis and justification of a moral norm. 35 The justification of a moral norm cannot be modeled on the abstract arguments of theoretical knowledge or the monological control of some theories of science. As a form of practical knowledge, the justification of a moral norm depends upon the legitimate expectations of freedom in a way that the logic of genesis or discovery is not accidental to but constitutive of moral truth.
The The phronetic character of moral reasoning provides an insight into the meaning of history which itself parallels the metaphorical structure of normativity. As normative nature is distinguished from the facticity of nature, history can be distinguished from the more primordial category of time. Time is the passing moments of the day; time recounts the succession of one moment to the next; time is a cosmocentric category. History, however, is an anthropocentric category; history is the progressive mediation of freedom's possibilities into time; history is the day as it contributes to and is interpreted by our life projects. 37 That is what Lonergan means when he observes that, "History is man's making of man." 38 As nature is carried over, molded, and transformed by the personal order, time is the medium for the exertion of human transcendence. Like the metaphorical structure of normativity, history reflects the imaginative and creative impulse of moral reasoning.
The difference between a cosmocentric and an anthropocentric conception of history is seen not only in different understandings of normative nature but also in different analyses of moral action. This means that the same critical approach to the natural law entailed in the metaphorical structure of normativity can be carried through in the determination of the moral object. As theory and praxis mutually condition each other, so too, an analysis of moral action presupposes and reflects a theory of normative nature.
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Within the neo-Scholastic manualist tradition, the metaphysic of the moral act centered on the meaning of the moral object. 40 The point of departure for the determination of the moral object was the finis operis. This of course made sense when the determination of the moral object was made within the epistemologica! tradition of realism. Nevertheless, this realist tradition was restricted by a modern notion of science and the casuistic categories of jurisprudence. 
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This traditional analysis of moral action had at least two important effects. First, moral objectivity was attributed to the phenomenal structure of the act, which in turn circumscribed the possible interpretations of the action. 43 Second, while this circumspection protected a high level of communicability in conformity to the modern ideal of science, the price that this communicability exacted was the impression that moral action no longer presupposed a human subject. There was a clear Une drawn between objective and subjective spheres of reality.
The metaphorical structure of normativity, however, provides the context in which to revise the traditional understanding of the relationship between the finis operis and the finis operantis in moral action. What was said of nature and person provides the basis for a renewed analysis of moral action which is freed from the tradition's stark and essentialist categories. Like nature as it is given, the ontic structure of the action is morally ambivalent and capable of various interpretations. Like nature, in other words, the ontic structure of the act is underdetermined. When normative nature is construed metaphorically, the meaning of the moral act is known only when read against the background of the ideology of human fulfillment. Our actions are not limited or defined by nature alone, but the legitimate expectations of freedom and insight in nature. The legitimate expectations of freedom form the subjective and transcendental ground for the objective meaning of the act. Now when the moral determination of the act depends on the moral object, the moral object is seen under the sway of the life project that predetermines freedom and insight. 44 The moral object is the result of a metaphorical redescription of the ontic structure of the act in light of the ideology of human fulfillment. In this sense, moral actions can be said to be a mimesis of the legitimate expectations of freedom. 45 In the context of a more critical theory of normative nature, then, the finis operantis can no longer be relegated to the psychology of action as in a reductive normative theory, but it now plays an active and constitutive role in the determination of the moral object of the act. What is done is always viewed from why it is done; that is, the finis operatis becomes the true finis operis of an act. 46 In the neo-Scholastic manuals of moral theology, the theory of intrinsically evil acts were treated under the analysis of moral action. A renewed analysis of action that is based on the metaphorical structure of normativity, then, will have repercussions on the much debated theory of intrinsically evil acts. 47 It must be remembered that the theory of intrinsically evil acts refers to the moral character of an action. As such, the theory of intrinsic evil refers to an action's ontological character and can never be reduced to or designated by a purely descriptive or ontic category. This prevents the theory of intrinsic evil from being equated with the naturalistic fallacy that is based on a positivist separation of fact and value. 48 Moral actions contain both evaluative and descriptive elements. Rather, as we have seen, entailed in normative theory and act analysis is a conception of history, so that a distinction can be drawn between the adequacy of the theory of intrinsic evil and the inadequacy of certain epistemologica! contexts in which the moral act is analyzed.
Within the cosmocentric notion of history, for instance, the analysis of intrinsically evil acts focuses on the ontic or phenomenal structure of the act in face of which the subject is a passive and accidental observer. This cosmocentric conception of history entails an uncritical understanding of normative nature in which the object of the moral act is strictly circumscribed, and moral language takes on a univocal character. 49 Within a cosmocentric notion of history, the theory of intrinsically evil acts is restricted by a naïve realist epistemology and a truncated normative theory.
Within an anthropocentric conception of history, however, the focus of the analysis of the moral act is the legitimate expectations of free-dorn that are constitutive of the moral object. As an anthropocentric category, history is reflective of the metaphorical structure of normativity that is based on a critical realist epistemology where nature is interpreted and ordered in terms of the person. Within the metaphorical structure of normativity and its concomitant analysis of moral action where moral acts are mimetic reflections of freedom, then, the theory of intrinsic evil does not refer to those acts abstracted from history and without regard to the moral subject, but to those acts that fall behind achieved standards of freedom according to which we shape our Uves in a human way. 50 The debate about the theory of intrinsic evil is not a question of the theory's validity. The debate, rather, is over the adequacy of the neo-Scholastic tradition's understanding of normative nature and its analysis of moral action in light of the requirements of history.
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This shift in contexts does not mean that the phenomenal character of the action can be ignored, any more than freedom and insight can be untethered from nature or (to invoke the parallel to hermeneutical theory again) any more than the text could be ignored in its valid interpretation. The shift in contexts means, rather, that within the metaphorical structure of normativity the theory of intrinsic evil is understood in a way that the moral object shares in the dialectical relationship between experience and insight. The moral object is not portable to any context as the tradition assumed, but reflects the scope and established limits of freedom's legitimate possibilities. As freedom's legitimate possibilities expand through experience and insight, a flexibility is introduced into the determination of the moral object that is not possible within an essentialist and epistemologically naïve normative theory or analysis of action.
Another point should be clarified to avoid any hint of relativism or historicism in regard to the theory of intrinsic evil. The theory of intrinsic evil is invoked at times to refer to those acts that cannot be justified under any circumstances. The theory assumes that there are no possible circumstances in which such an action could be justified. Such actions are often described in formal moral terms. The issue, however, is not whether actions like lying or murder or adultery can ever be justified, but what constitutes those actions. 52 My purpose in this article has been to cast the relationship between person and nature in terms of metaphor not only to respect their essential unity but to gain a number of other insights into moral reasoning. The metaphorical structure of normativity guarantees that natural-law arguments share in the revelatory character of metaphor, in that the praxis sanctioned or prohibited by a moral norm reveals and introduces one into the community's legitimate expectations of freedom, the community's way of being and acting with others in the world. The metaphorical structure of normativity also retrieves the phronetic character of moral reasoning and underscores that moral reasoning plays an active and creative role in shaping nature in the service of the good of the person. And finally, metaphor is the vehicle for historical change, so that metaphorical redescription is the means for the disclosure of "new insights into the nature of life and new possibilities of human dwelling." This means that nature is always redescribed in light of the ideology of human fulfillment in such a way that normative nature is not a univocal reality but shares in the dialectical structure of experience and insight.
